What happens to your phone if you can’t hold it
The device: hardened before it ever touches your life
You keep ownership of your own phone (a Google Pixel), and hand it in once for a provisioning pass. An operator installs and hardens everything, and what comes back runs GrapheneOS: bootloader relocked, verified by hardware attestation against the promised build on genuine hardware.
Encryption with hardware-backed limits
Everything is encrypted with keys wrapped in a hardware verified-boot hierarchy, your lock-screen secret mixed in. A hardware attempt counter of roughly 20 tries with escalating delays makes brute-forcing a copied storage impractical. Before first unlock after boot, the data keys don’t exist in memory, and the device auto-reboots (18 h default, configurable) so a seized, locked device returns to that strongest state within hours.
Per GrapheneOS documented data-at-rest behaviorThe extraction paths are closed
While locked, the USB-C port is charge-only: data connections refuse at both the USB controller and the kernel, and a charge-only cable ships in the box as a hardware backstop. No ADB, no debugging, no cloud account ever tethers to the device.
Removes the data-cable entry path commercial forensic toolkits rely onAnti-tracking, layered
Per-app network permissions with VPN lockdown, disabled Wi-Fi/Bluetooth scanning, randomized MACs, storage and contact scoping, no advertising ID, and no Google account anywhere. The apps your peers see never learn more than you allow.
Per GrapheneOS network permission and storage-scope documentationYour vault, your only key
Your whole anonymous identity (every login, credential, one-time code) lives in an encrypted KeePass vault on the device: unique generated passwords at 32 characters (up to 64 for high-value entries), OTP seeds stored in the vault itself, auto-lock shortly after use. The operator pre-registers your service credentials during provisioning; you hold the only key. One wipe removes the whole trail.
Credential card carries only what you memorize, then destroyA bundle chosen for jobs, not for shelf appeal
Each app is open-source or verifiably first-party, covers exactly one job no other app does, and is hash-pinned against its publisher’s official per-release record at install: a mismatch refuses the whole provisioning job.
| App | Job | Configuration you receive |
|---|---|---|
| CipherCell eSIM | Connectivity leg: no-KYC, data-only | Installed and verified at provisioning; per-device wallet bounds carrier-side correlation |
| Signal | Strongest content protection for peers already on it | Pre-registered from a number untied to you; usernames on; “who can find me by my number” and “who can see my number” set to Nobody |
| Threema | Messaging with no phone number or email at signup | Random ID issued; address-book sync off; contacts by ID or QR only |
| SimpleX | The no-identifier messenger, and your support line | No user identifiers at all; Tor routing mandatory for the support chat |
| Tuta Mail | Anonymous written correspondence | New account, no recovery tie to any real identity |
| Tor Browser | Web use without leaking IP or fingerprint | Hash-pinned from official sums; no accounts, no personal bookmarks |
| Cake Wallet | The Monero leg of the money loop | New XMR wallet, mnemonic recorded in the vault, funded and verified at handover |
| Mullvad VPN | Tunnel privacy with an anonymous numbered account | Always-on with “block connections without VPN” lockdown |
| AirGuard | Detects nearby rogue BLE trackers | An alert you can act on when someone plants an AirTag-style tag |
| Neruppu | Physical-intrusion tripwire for a monitored room | Camera, microphone, accelerometer and light detection; alerts when someone enters |
| Cryptomator | Files that survive your device | Encrypted container backed up to anonymously-signed-up cloud; vault restores rehearsed until proven |
| GPX Mock Location | Location alibi for apps that demand GPS | Premade location time maps pre-loaded; the carrier still knows where you are, and the training says so |
| EXIF Remove | Strips photo metadata before sharing | Made a habit, not an option, by the training material |
| LocalSend | Cloud-free file exchange | Peer-to-peer on trusted networks only |
| OpenKeychain | OpenPGP for documents and mail | Keypair generated; private key lives in the vault |
| MacroDroid | Carries the distress-trigger wiring | Airplane-mode-mimicking trigger to wipe; nothing personal stored |
| BlockAds | System-wide ad/tracker blocking | Fewer identifier-exfiltration paths to police |
The wipe paths: defense in rings, outcome shown
When the adversary holds your unlocked prompt
Device and every installed eSIM wiped, uninterruptible. The credential was never recorded by any operator: there is nothing to seize from us about it.
When you can’t reach the phone
72 h without an unlock (your default, set at provisioning) arms the same catastrophic wipe. The user’s use resets the clock; the seizure’s failure to unlock does not.
When a term lapses past the published window
Bare device: every credential, message and file gone, eSIMs erased, in step with the service purging its own records. Nothing anywhere could re-correlate the device to a past customer. Re-provisioning brings it back to service.
What the service never learns
There is no signup with a name, email, phone number or address, and no account concept, anywhere. The relationship is carried by your device and a single opaque credential: shown once, stored by the service only as a hash. The operator, at any instant, could not tell you who a customer is.
Monero only
Every invoice is quoted in XMR on a fresh one-time wallet subaddress each cycle. No card, no bank transfer, no email receipt exists anywhere in the flow.
Payment breaks the identity link at the railTor on every connection
The status page, renewals and support are reachable only through a Tor onion service, riding over the always-on VPN. There is no portal listener on the public internet at all; nothing can be pushed to your device; it only pulls.
Pull-only trust: no push channel, no identity beyond the opaque credentialA no-KYC eSIM, sized to your term
The bundled data eSIM is bought with crypto and requires no identity documents: one profile per device, funded from a per-device wallet, topped up at every renewal. Even the vendor-side correlation is bounded to a single device.
One eSIM per device; a fresh one only at provisioning or replacementSupport that can’t name you
Support is a chat over SimpleX, whose relay cannot link chats to anyone, linked through your own token. Operators work under pseudonymous operator IDs with hardware-key authentication: a compromise of the service can’t reveal the people running it, and they never had your name to give.
No address-book sync anywhere in the bundle, per each maker’s guidanceA signed canary, every 30 days
A dated operator statement that no warrant or compulsion of the listed kinds has reached us, signed air-gapped, published on a fixed 30-day cadence.
Ed25519, RFC 8032, pinned to RFC test vectorsAnonymity by expiry
When a term lapses, the purge runs on both sides: the service deletes the credential, support-chat linkage and provider identifiers, and the device wipes itself entirely at the end of the same grace window. Nothing that could re-correlate a device to a past customer survives on either end.
Holds act on the service side only; the device never learns of themThe price sheet: what each piece costs
The opening six-month term is AUD 800 and every renewal AUD 1,200, settled in Monero: one payment for the whole provisioned service. This is the supply sheet behind it: every purchase is an untraceable Monero (XMR) payment, with introductory offers running at provisioning:
| Component | The work | Price | Introductory offer |
|---|---|---|---|
| GrapheneOS flashed onto a Google Pixel phone | One-time flash, relock and hardware attestation | AUD 350 | AUD 250 (introductory discount AUD 100) |
| Hardening + custom dead-man's switch | GrapheneOS hardening (Cellebrite anti-forensic configuration) and the custom dead-man's switch, configured together | AUD 500 | AUD 250 (introductory discount AUD 250) |
| Anonymous no-KYC eSIM | 50 GB data, 6-month term: an untraceable Monero purchase | AUD 350 | AUD 250 (introductory discount AUD 100) |
| Anonymous VPN | 6-month subscription, numbered account: an untraceable Monero purchase | AUD 50 | None |
Introductory offers are one-time, set at provisioning, and paid in Monero with no identity attached. Extra data packages are billed on demand when usage crosses 80% of the eSIM package.
Renewal is never a deadline ambush
A reminder 10 days before expiry, then escalating notices through the grace window. Quotes are valid for 60 minutes on the spot. Late renewal is always accepted within the 30-day grace window, and a renewed subscription never wipes.
Wipe state is computed from the clock; it can’t desync from what you seeAmbiguous payment raises a hold, not a guess
Payment settles your subscription the moment it lands, before any internal renewal runs. If a settlement is ambiguous, the service raises a payment-investigation hold and tells you; a hold acts on the service side only: it can suspend what the service does, never what your device will do, and your device is not told of it.
Holds never erase an already-confirmed verificationData that behaves
When usage crosses 80% of the eSIM package, one-click extra-data packages appear, bought for you, billed like a renewal, without identity.
Per-device wallet bounds any vendor-side correlationWipe is not the end of the deal
A wipe destroys device data, never the subscription: a lapsed-and-wiped device returns as a bare device through a re-provisioning pass, priced at direct costs plus a modest labor margin.
Re-provisioning during an active term does not change the expiryHow it begins: the handoff
Bring or be met with your own Google Pixel. The paper chain is the only link to a real person, and you memorize, then destroy it.
- Your device in, nothing on it. No personal content is ever on the phone handed to the operator.
- The initial invoice, AUD 800 for the opening six-month term: printed, quote and QR code, payable in Monero. Provisioning begins the moment it settles.
- The provisioning pass. Flash, verify, relock; install and pin every bundled app; pre-register your anonymous identity into the vault.
- The credential card. An initial vault passphrase and your device PIN, printed once. Memorize them, then destroy or secure the card. The card deliberately carries no service credentials; those are already in your vault.
What the subscription includes
Every item below ships inside the term unless it says otherwise. Live items are on the provisioned device today; anything still in design carries its honest stamp.
GrapheneOS hardening
LIVECellebrite anti-forensics as hardened configuration: the device refuses the extraction toolkit's entry paths. Never a guarantee, never immunity: the limits are printed in the Security Promise.
USB data connectivity disabled
LIVEWhile locked, the port is power-only; a charge-only cable ships as the hardware backstop.
Custom dead-man's switch with decoy apps
LIVEA not-unlocked-for timer (72 h default) wired through decoy apps (Signal, Telegram, Threema, Session) so the trigger layer looks like an ordinary communication setup.
Time-lock trigger
LIVEThe timer the user's normal use resets, and the seizure's silence does not.
Airplane-mode wipe trigger
LIVEAn actionable quick-settings tile that arms the same catastrophic wipe under observation, without touching your radios.
Ongoing updates and security patches
LIVESigned manifest updates delivered over the anonymous poll channel: the security spine is never modified by an update.
Warrant canary
LIVEA dated operator statement, signed air-gapped, published on a fixed 30-day cadence.
Attestation server certification
LIVEProvisioning ends with hardware attestation against our self-hosted server, proving the device runs the promised build on genuine hardware.
The Security Promise: what no setting fixes
A phone cannot be made anonymous by settings, and no configuration can be sold as invulnerability. Where competitors hide their limits, CipherCell prints them on the same card.
01 · The handoff itself. Ordering and physical handover tie a device to a person in the world. Monero payment, no paperwork, and an ephemeral paper credential reduce the tie without erasing it.
02 · The mobile network. A device that emits radio is known to the carrier, by identifier and by tower location, every time it connects. Privacy settings protect traffic, never the fact of connection; radio-silence habits at sensitive times are taught, not promised.
03 · Behavior in metadata. Carrying this phone beside a personal phone, reusing patterns, or long single-identity use can deanonymize a person even with every setting perfect.
04 · Upstream services. The VPN operator still sees tunnel metadata, messaging servers still see ciphertext and some timing, and an eSIM supplier has its own upstream. Layered, not absolute.
05 · Compulsion and compromise. The duress and timer paths exist so that being forced is made harmless: they destroy data, they do not promise perpetual anonymity. No configuration defeats an unknown exploit, chip-off extraction, or an adversary who watched the lock-screen secret.
06 · A seized, unlocked device is at its weakest until auto-reboot lands the stronger locked state; a wipe that must reach the device needs the network at some point in its delivery.