What happens to your phone if you can’t hold it

THREE STANDALONE WIPE TRIGGERS · NONE OF THEM DEPENDS ON US · NOTHING WAITS FOR PERMISSION
01 · DURESS PIN
Full wipe of device and eSIMs
A credential only you know. Enter it at any unlock prompt and the wipe is immediate and uninterruptible. No operator has ever seen, stored, or written it down.
02 · DEAD-MAN’S TIMER
Wipe after 72 hours of no unlock
Use your phone and the clock resets. If you’re detained or simply away, it fires. A quick-settings tile that looks like airplane mode arms it under observation, without touching your radios.
03 · LAPSE WIPE
Announced all through 30 days
Renew in the grace window and it never fires. Escalating notices run the whole way; late renewal is always accepted until it does.
AUD 800OPENING SIX-MONTH TERM · AUD 1,200 RENEWAL · MONERO ONLY
BEGIN PROVISIONING

The device: hardened before it ever touches your life

You keep ownership of your own phone (a Google Pixel), and hand it in once for a provisioning pass. An operator installs and hardens everything, and what comes back runs GrapheneOS: bootloader relocked, verified by hardware attestation against the promised build on genuine hardware.

Encryption with hardware-backed limits

Everything is encrypted with keys wrapped in a hardware verified-boot hierarchy, your lock-screen secret mixed in. A hardware attempt counter of roughly 20 tries with escalating delays makes brute-forcing a copied storage impractical. Before first unlock after boot, the data keys don’t exist in memory, and the device auto-reboots (18 h default, configurable) so a seized, locked device returns to that strongest state within hours.

Per GrapheneOS documented data-at-rest behavior

The extraction paths are closed

While locked, the USB-C port is charge-only: data connections refuse at both the USB controller and the kernel, and a charge-only cable ships in the box as a hardware backstop. No ADB, no debugging, no cloud account ever tethers to the device.

Removes the data-cable entry path commercial forensic toolkits rely on

Anti-tracking, layered

Per-app network permissions with VPN lockdown, disabled Wi-Fi/Bluetooth scanning, randomized MACs, storage and contact scoping, no advertising ID, and no Google account anywhere. The apps your peers see never learn more than you allow.

Per GrapheneOS network permission and storage-scope documentation

Your vault, your only key

Your whole anonymous identity (every login, credential, one-time code) lives in an encrypted KeePass vault on the device: unique generated passwords at 32 characters (up to 64 for high-value entries), OTP seeds stored in the vault itself, auto-lock shortly after use. The operator pre-registers your service credentials during provisioning; you hold the only key. One wipe removes the whole trail.

Credential card carries only what you memorize, then destroy

A bundle chosen for jobs, not for shelf appeal

Each app is open-source or verifiably first-party, covers exactly one job no other app does, and is hash-pinned against its publisher’s official per-release record at install: a mismatch refuses the whole provisioning job.

AppJobConfiguration you receive
CipherCell eSIMConnectivity leg: no-KYC, data-onlyInstalled and verified at provisioning; per-device wallet bounds carrier-side correlation
SignalStrongest content protection for peers already on itPre-registered from a number untied to you; usernames on; “who can find me by my number” and “who can see my number” set to Nobody
ThreemaMessaging with no phone number or email at signupRandom ID issued; address-book sync off; contacts by ID or QR only
SimpleXThe no-identifier messenger, and your support lineNo user identifiers at all; Tor routing mandatory for the support chat
Tuta MailAnonymous written correspondenceNew account, no recovery tie to any real identity
Tor BrowserWeb use without leaking IP or fingerprintHash-pinned from official sums; no accounts, no personal bookmarks
Cake WalletThe Monero leg of the money loopNew XMR wallet, mnemonic recorded in the vault, funded and verified at handover
Mullvad VPNTunnel privacy with an anonymous numbered accountAlways-on with “block connections without VPN” lockdown
AirGuardDetects nearby rogue BLE trackersAn alert you can act on when someone plants an AirTag-style tag
NeruppuPhysical-intrusion tripwire for a monitored roomCamera, microphone, accelerometer and light detection; alerts when someone enters
CryptomatorFiles that survive your deviceEncrypted container backed up to anonymously-signed-up cloud; vault restores rehearsed until proven
GPX Mock LocationLocation alibi for apps that demand GPSPremade location time maps pre-loaded; the carrier still knows where you are, and the training says so
EXIF RemoveStrips photo metadata before sharingMade a habit, not an option, by the training material
LocalSendCloud-free file exchangePeer-to-peer on trusted networks only
OpenKeychainOpenPGP for documents and mailKeypair generated; private key lives in the vault
MacroDroidCarries the distress-trigger wiringAirplane-mode-mimicking trigger to wipe; nothing personal stored
BlockAdsSystem-wide ad/tracker blockingFewer identifier-exfiltration paths to police

The wipe paths: defense in rings, outcome shown

01 · DURESS PIN

When the adversary holds your unlocked prompt

OUTCOME: SHOWN, NOT PROMISED

Device and every installed eSIM wiped, uninterruptible. The credential was never recorded by any operator: there is nothing to seize from us about it.

02 · DEAD-MAN’S TIMER

When you can’t reach the phone

OUTCOME: SHOWN, NOT PROMISED

72 h without an unlock (your default, set at provisioning) arms the same catastrophic wipe. The user’s use resets the clock; the seizure’s failure to unlock does not.

03 · LAPSE WIPE

When a term lapses past the published window

THE STATE AFTER

Bare device: every credential, message and file gone, eSIMs erased, in step with the service purging its own records. Nothing anywhere could re-correlate the device to a past customer. Re-provisioning brings it back to service.

What the service never learns

There is no signup with a name, email, phone number or address, and no account concept, anywhere. The relationship is carried by your device and a single opaque credential: shown once, stored by the service only as a hash. The operator, at any instant, could not tell you who a customer is.

Monero only

Every invoice is quoted in XMR on a fresh one-time wallet subaddress each cycle. No card, no bank transfer, no email receipt exists anywhere in the flow.

Payment breaks the identity link at the rail

Tor on every connection

The status page, renewals and support are reachable only through a Tor onion service, riding over the always-on VPN. There is no portal listener on the public internet at all; nothing can be pushed to your device; it only pulls.

Pull-only trust: no push channel, no identity beyond the opaque credential

A no-KYC eSIM, sized to your term

The bundled data eSIM is bought with crypto and requires no identity documents: one profile per device, funded from a per-device wallet, topped up at every renewal. Even the vendor-side correlation is bounded to a single device.

One eSIM per device; a fresh one only at provisioning or replacement

Support that can’t name you

Support is a chat over SimpleX, whose relay cannot link chats to anyone, linked through your own token. Operators work under pseudonymous operator IDs with hardware-key authentication: a compromise of the service can’t reveal the people running it, and they never had your name to give.

No address-book sync anywhere in the bundle, per each maker’s guidance

A signed canary, every 30 days

A dated operator statement that no warrant or compulsion of the listed kinds has reached us, signed air-gapped, published on a fixed 30-day cadence.

Ed25519, RFC 8032, pinned to RFC test vectors

Anonymity by expiry

When a term lapses, the purge runs on both sides: the service deletes the credential, support-chat linkage and provider identifiers, and the device wipes itself entirely at the end of the same grace window. Nothing that could re-correlate a device to a past customer survives on either end.

Holds act on the service side only; the device never learns of them

The price sheet: what each piece costs

The opening six-month term is AUD 800 and every renewal AUD 1,200, settled in Monero: one payment for the whole provisioned service. This is the supply sheet behind it: every purchase is an untraceable Monero (XMR) payment, with introductory offers running at provisioning:

ComponentThe workPriceIntroductory offer
GrapheneOS flashed onto a Google Pixel phoneOne-time flash, relock and hardware attestationAUD 350AUD 250 (introductory discount AUD 100)
Hardening + custom dead-man's switchGrapheneOS hardening (Cellebrite anti-forensic configuration) and the custom dead-man's switch, configured togetherAUD 500AUD 250 (introductory discount AUD 250)
Anonymous no-KYC eSIM50 GB data, 6-month term: an untraceable Monero purchaseAUD 350AUD 250 (introductory discount AUD 100)
Anonymous VPN6-month subscription, numbered account: an untraceable Monero purchaseAUD 50None

Introductory offers are one-time, set at provisioning, and paid in Monero with no identity attached. Extra data packages are billed on demand when usage crosses 80% of the eSIM package.

Renewal is never a deadline ambush

A reminder 10 days before expiry, then escalating notices through the grace window. Quotes are valid for 60 minutes on the spot. Late renewal is always accepted within the 30-day grace window, and a renewed subscription never wipes.

Wipe state is computed from the clock; it can’t desync from what you see

Ambiguous payment raises a hold, not a guess

Payment settles your subscription the moment it lands, before any internal renewal runs. If a settlement is ambiguous, the service raises a payment-investigation hold and tells you; a hold acts on the service side only: it can suspend what the service does, never what your device will do, and your device is not told of it.

Holds never erase an already-confirmed verification

Data that behaves

When usage crosses 80% of the eSIM package, one-click extra-data packages appear, bought for you, billed like a renewal, without identity.

Per-device wallet bounds any vendor-side correlation

Wipe is not the end of the deal

A wipe destroys device data, never the subscription: a lapsed-and-wiped device returns as a bare device through a re-provisioning pass, priced at direct costs plus a modest labor margin.

Re-provisioning during an active term does not change the expiry

How it begins: the handoff

Bring or be met with your own Google Pixel. The paper chain is the only link to a real person, and you memorize, then destroy it.

  1. Your device in, nothing on it. No personal content is ever on the phone handed to the operator.
  2. The initial invoice, AUD 800 for the opening six-month term: printed, quote and QR code, payable in Monero. Provisioning begins the moment it settles.
  3. The provisioning pass. Flash, verify, relock; install and pin every bundled app; pre-register your anonymous identity into the vault.
  4. The credential card. An initial vault passphrase and your device PIN, printed once. Memorize them, then destroy or secure the card. The card deliberately carries no service credentials; those are already in your vault.

What the subscription includes

Every item below ships inside the term unless it says otherwise. Live items are on the provisioned device today; anything still in design carries its honest stamp.

  1. GrapheneOS hardening

    LIVE

    Cellebrite anti-forensics as hardened configuration: the device refuses the extraction toolkit's entry paths. Never a guarantee, never immunity: the limits are printed in the Security Promise.

  2. USB data connectivity disabled

    LIVE

    While locked, the port is power-only; a charge-only cable ships as the hardware backstop.

  3. Custom dead-man's switch with decoy apps

    LIVE

    A not-unlocked-for timer (72 h default) wired through decoy apps (Signal, Telegram, Threema, Session) so the trigger layer looks like an ordinary communication setup.

  4. Time-lock trigger

    LIVE

    The timer the user's normal use resets, and the seizure's silence does not.

  5. Airplane-mode wipe trigger

    LIVE

    An actionable quick-settings tile that arms the same catastrophic wipe under observation, without touching your radios.

  6. Ongoing updates and security patches

    LIVE

    Signed manifest updates delivered over the anonymous poll channel: the security spine is never modified by an update.

  7. Warrant canary

    LIVE

    A dated operator statement, signed air-gapped, published on a fixed 30-day cadence.

  8. Attestation server certification

    LIVE

    Provisioning ends with hardware attestation against our self-hosted server, proving the device runs the promised build on genuine hardware.

The Security Promise: what no setting fixes

A phone cannot be made anonymous by settings, and no configuration can be sold as invulnerability. Where competitors hide their limits, CipherCell prints them on the same card.

01 · The handoff itself. Ordering and physical handover tie a device to a person in the world. Monero payment, no paperwork, and an ephemeral paper credential reduce the tie without erasing it.

02 · The mobile network. A device that emits radio is known to the carrier, by identifier and by tower location, every time it connects. Privacy settings protect traffic, never the fact of connection; radio-silence habits at sensitive times are taught, not promised.

03 · Behavior in metadata. Carrying this phone beside a personal phone, reusing patterns, or long single-identity use can deanonymize a person even with every setting perfect.

04 · Upstream services. The VPN operator still sees tunnel metadata, messaging servers still see ciphertext and some timing, and an eSIM supplier has its own upstream. Layered, not absolute.

05 · Compulsion and compromise. The duress and timer paths exist so that being forced is made harmless: they destroy data, they do not promise perpetual anonymity. No configuration defeats an unknown exploit, chip-off extraction, or an adversary who watched the lock-screen secret.

06 · A seized, unlocked device is at its weakest until auto-reboot lands the stronger locked state; a wipe that must reach the device needs the network at some point in its delivery.